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CONFIDENTIALITY, COUNSELING, AND CARE:
WHEN OTHERS NEED TO KNOW WHAT CLIENTS
NEED TO DISCLOSE
Janine Sisak*
INTRODUCTION
Matthew has recently been diagnosed HIV-positive. 1 Facing the
possibility of developing a fatal and incurable disease,2 he is obviously
scared-not only of dying, but also of the radical impact the diagnosis
will have on his life. Because of the stigma attached to the virus, 3 he
fears discrimination at the workplace4 and in his social circles. Be-
cause many people have an irrational fear of contracting the virus 5 he
* Special thanks to Bruce Green and Russell Pearce for their help and guidance.
1. The results of Matthew's blood test indicated a presence of antibodies to the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"). See Mary Ellen Hombs, AIDS Crisis in
America: A Reference Handbook 62 (1992). HIV is a virus that damages the body's
immune system, leaving it vulnerable to a wide variety of opportunistic infections and
malignancies, which in turn produce an array of symptoms known as the acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome ("AIDS"). See Jeffrey T. Huber, HIV/AIDS Community
Information Services: Experiences in Serving Both At-Risk and HIV-Infected Popu-
lations 11 (1996).
2. AIDS is a debilitating disease that seems to kill without exception. Loretta
McLaughlin, AIDS: An Overview, in The AIDS Epidemic: Private Rights and the
Public Interest 15, 18 (Padraig O'Malley ed., 1989) [hereinafter AIDS Epidemic]. As
of today, there is no cure. See Huber, supra note 1, at 24.
3. Although heterosexual transmission is rapidly increasing in the United States,
AIDS disproportionately affects gay men and intravenous drug users. See Hombs,
supra note 1, at 2; see also Ronald Bayer, Private Acts, Social Consequences: AIDS
and the Politics of Public Health 21-22 (1989) (describing the beginnings of what was
first labeled gay-related immune deficiency or GRID); McLaughlin, supra note 2, in
AIDS Epidemic, supra note 2 at 15-16, 24 (same). Because the AIDS epidemic first
hit these historically disadvantaged groups, a stigma developed, which was driven by
social factors such as political disenfrancishment, homophobia, and racism. See
Hombs, supra note 1, at 2. The effect of this intense stigma has been a further
marginalization of already marginalized groups. See Robert T. Begg, Legal Ethics and
AIDS: An Analysis of Selected Issues, 3 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1, 9 (1989); see also
McLaughlin, supra note 2, in AIDS Epidemic, supra note 2, at 24 (noting that the
homosexual stigma attached to AIDS resulted in political neglect while encouraging
"pseudo-religio-political prejudice and vindictiveness").
4. The myths and fears about the nature, cause, and transmission of the disease
have led to widespread discrimination against people with HIV/AIDS. See generally
ACLU, Epidemic of Fear: A Survey of AIDS Discrimination in the 1980s and Policy
Recommendations for the 1990s (1990) (analyzing complainant population and dis-
crimination types as well as national and state trends in discriminatory behavior);
Lawrence 0. Gostin, The AIDS Litigation Project. A National Review of Court and
Human Rights Commission Decisions, Part II: Discrimination, 263 JAMA 2086 (1990)
(reviewing highly litigated areas of AIDS discrimination including education, housing,
employment, public accommodation, health care, and insurance).
5. An unreasonable fear of contracting AIDS continues despite substantial proof
that HIV is not transmitted through normal, non-sexual social interaction or casual
contact. See Hombs, supra note 1, at 7 (recounting findings that HIV is transmitted
only through the direct exchange of blood, semen, or vaginal secretion). This fear is
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fears being ostracized-in effect, quarantined from society.6 Matthew
faces the possibility of losing friends and loved ones at a time when he
needs emotional support the most.
Amidst this emotional distress, Matthew realizes that he needs to
consult with a lawyer about drafting a will and other estate planning
issues.7 Because confidentiality is his primary concern, he visits a not-
for-profit legal services organization" dedicated to assisting people
with HIV/AIDS. 9 He reasons that the attorney there will understand
encouraged by "the nature of the disease, by inflammatory reporting of AIDS-related
matters in the news media, and by the impact of powerful [sexual] taboos." See Begg,
supra note 3, at 8.
6. See George A. Lamb & Linette G. Liebling, The Role of Education in AIDS
Prevention, in The AIDS Epidemic, supra note 2, at 315 (noting "unprecedented hys-
teria and fear of contagion, leading to isolation of persons with AIDS and their
friends and families").
7. For lawyers representing people with HIV, one of the most common tasks is
drafting wills. Rhonda R. Rivera, Lawyers, Clients, and AIDS: Some Notes from the
Trenches, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 883, 891 (1989); see also William A. Bradford, Jr., Rendering
Legal Aid to People with AIDS, 37 Prac. Law., June 1991, at 23, 27 (listing wills, pow-
ers of attorney, living wills, and trusts as ways in which lawyers can organize clients'
affairs to help them prepare for death).
8. People with HIV/AIDS often turn to public interest organizations for three
reasons. First, contracting the virus frequently drives people into financial ruin. See
Giovanni Anzalone, Note, AIDS and Mandatory Pro Bono: A Step Toward the Equal
Administration of Justice, 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 691, 692-94 (1995) (describing the
effect that AIDS has in drawing people into poverty as a consequence of the attached
medical costs). The cost of the drugs used in treatment are prohibitively expensive,
especially now that the new costly multi-drug therapies are proving to be most effec-
tive. See Robert Pear, Expense Means Many Can't Get Drugs for AIDS, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 16, 1997, at Al. Insurance coverage, although somewhat helpful, does not cover
much of these pharmaceutical expenses. Id. Accordingly, people with HIV must turn
to legal services or not-for-profit organizations that charge on a sliding scale, if they
charge at all.
Second, people with HIV/AIDS often need a wide range of legal services because
contracting the virus often raises many legal issues. See generally Rivera, supra note 7,
at 891-925 (discussing in detail the legal needs of people with HIV/AIDS). For in-
stance, a person with HIV might need assistance navigating entitlement programs. Id.
at 908. He also might want to bring a discrimination complaint if he feels that he was
fired on the basis of his seropositivity. Id. at 912. Further, he likely will need estate
planning services for drafting living wills, medical powers of attorney, and other docu-
ments. Id. at 891-903. He might even need help with a family law issue if he is in-
volved in a divorce or a custody battle. Id. at 922. Public interest organizations
provide this type of holistic service because they are situated to assist a population,
rather than specialize in a particular area of law.
Finally, even if the person has money and desires assistance from a private firm or
practitioner, he may consult with several lawyers and be denied legal representation
on an "ethically" discriminatory basis. See Begg, supra note 3, at 18 (explaining that a
lawyer has full discretion under the ethical rules to reject any client he wishes). If the
person cannot find a lawyer who is willing to represent a person with HIV, the person
may have no choice but to go to a public interest organization. For an excellent dis-
cussion of how attorney-based discrimination can lead to underrepresentation of peo-
ple with HIV, see id. at 14-40.
9. Although a person with HIV can obtain appropriate services from general
legal services organizations, he might feel more comfortable at a legal organization
that specializes in providing a wide range of services to people with HIV. See Brad-
CONFIDENTIALITY AND COUNSELING
the importance of keeping his seropositivity' ° strictly confidential,
considering the potential detriment that might result from disclosure.
Matthew meets his lawyer, Sarah, for the first time. In addition to
describing his legal needs, he shares many personal facts with her.
Although Sarah is not surprised when Matthew discloses his seroposi-
tivity, she is surprised when he states his expectation of strict confi-
dentiality, and then specifically asks her to tell no one of his status,
including his live-in partner, Ben. He explains that he loves Ben very
much and that he cannot risk losing him. He even tells Sarah that he
has engaged in unprotected sex since his diagnosis to keep Ben from
suspecting that he is HIV-positive.
Sarah faces an ethical dilemma. She certainly recognizes the height-
ened need for confidentiality in representing people with HIV. In her
experience, she has never disclosed the seropositivity of any client un-
less disclosure was necessary in the course of representation. Further-
more, Matthew has specifically asked for her strictest confidentiality
based on reasonable fears that significant harm might result from dis-
closure. On the other hand, she has learned enough about his per-
sonal life to realize that Ben, an innocent third party, is at risk of
contracting the virus. If she discloses, she may prevent Ben from con-
tracting HIV by warning him of the risk.
This hypothetical is a challenging one for any lawyer. On one level,
it requires the lawyer to analyze the confidentiality provisions of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility" ("Model Code") and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 2 ("Model Rules") to see if Sa-
rah has discretion to disclose. On another level, the hypothetical chal-
lenges Sarah to analyze her role as a lawyer, and more specifically, her
role as a lawyer representing people with HIV. Identifying her lawy-
ering role will be critical in the development of the representation.
Part I of this Note explains the confidentiality provisions of both the
Model Rules and Model Code and analyzes whether the ethical rules
permit a discretionary departure from the general duty of confidenti-
ality. Part I suggests that, assuming the rules permit discretion, a law-
yer in Sarah's position should choose not to disclose. Part II contrasts
two varying lawyering models that would influence this exercise of
ford, supra note 7, at 24 (encouraging lawyers to work with AIDS service organiza-
tions because people with IV are most likely to trust a lawyer affiliated with such
groups). Specialized organizations might be better at addressing some of the common
sensitive legal issues like discrimination and confidentiality. See Rivera, supra note 7,
at 891 (suggesting that these organizations have experience in resolving common
problems). They might also be better suited to offer HIV/AIDS-related social serv-
ices in conjunction with legal assistance. See Bradford, supra note 7, at 24 (explaining
that AIDS service organizations are often equipped to provide anonymous HIV test-
ing, counseling, AIDS prevention education, medical referrals, and housing
assistance).
10. Seropositivity means testing positive for lIV. Hombs, supra note 1. at 63.
11. Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1980) [hereinafter Model Code].
12. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1994) [hereinafter Model Rules].
1997] 2749
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discretion in ultimately counseling the client to disclose on his own.
Part III advances yet a third model, the ethic of care, that integrates a
relationship-oriented dimension of moral reasoning into legal repre-
sentation. This Note concludes that care reasoning would result in
more influential, and thus more effective counseling.
I. PROFESSIONAL DuTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
In confronting this ethical dilemma, Sarah must first look to the eth-
ical rules for guidance. Thus, this part introduces the relevant confi-
dentiality provisions of the Model Rules and the Model Code.13 It
then analyzes whether the future crime exception to these rules ap-
plies here, thereby granting Sarah the discretion to disclose. This part
concludes that, even assuming she has the discretion to disclose, Sarah
should not disclose Matthew's seropositivity to his partner.
A. Confidentiality Provisions
Both the Model Rules and the Model Code promote confidentiality
subject to a few well-defined exceptions. 14 In essence, both confiden-
tiality provisions set up a presumption of nondisclosure.1 5  Model
Rule 1.616 provides that an attorney "shall not" reveal any informa-
13. Although the professional duty of confidentiality is related to the attorney-
client privilege, it is much broader in scope. Model Code, supra note 11, EC 4-4. First,
the privilege only prevents the court from compelling the attorney to testify about his
professional communications with a client. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.6 cmt.
5. The professional duty, in contrast, demands confidentiality at all times, preventing
voluntary disclosures except when made in furtherance of legal representation. Id.
cmt. 5, cmt. 7. Second, the duty protects more than privileged information; it also
seems to protect most other information gained by the attorney in the professional
capacity. Id. cmt. 5.
Here, the hypothetical does not require a lengthy discussion of the attorney-client
evidentiary privilege because the lawyer is not asked to testify. This Note's analysis,
therefore, will be limited to the professional duty of confidentiality.
14. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.6 cmt. 9; see also Harry I. Subin, The Law-
yer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 Iowa L. Rev.
1091, 1147-54 (1985) (explaining the broad scope and the narrow exceptions con-
tained in the confidentiality provisions).
15. Subin, supra note 14, at 1148, 1151.
16. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.6. This provision provides, in pertinent
part:
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclo-
sures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the repre-
sentation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer rea-
sonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substan-
tial bodily harm ....
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tion about a client "relating to representation." 17  Likewise, Discipli-
nary Rule'8 ("DR") 4-10111 requires that the lawyer "shall not
knowingly" reveal confidences or secrets.20 "Confidences" are those
communications that would be protected under the attorney-client
privilege, while "secrets" consist of any information acquired through
the professional relationship that "the client has requested to be held
inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would
be likely to be detrimental to the client."21
The Model Rules and the Model Code both set limits to confidenti-
ality in the form of exceptions. 2 These exceptions, which are referred
to as future crime exceptions,2 permit, rather than require, lawyers to
disclose client confidences to the extent necessary to prevent a crime
from occurring.' Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) allows the lawyer to disclose
17. Id. Rule 1.6(a).
18. The Model Code consists of both Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary
Rules. See Model Code, supra note 11, Preliminary Statement. While the Ethical Con-
siderations are aspirational in nature, the Disciplinary Rules, by defining the mini-
mum level of conduct necessary to avoid disciplinary action, are mandatory. Id.
19. Id. DR 4-101(A). This provision provides, in pertinent part:
DR 4-101 Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client.
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-cli-
ent privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other in-
formation gained in the professional relationship that the client has
requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be
embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not
knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of
the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of
himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after full
disclosure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients
affected, but only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary
Rules or required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the informa-
tion necessary to prevent the crime.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
20. Id. DR 4-101(B)(1).
21. Id. DR 4-101(A). In comparison to DR 4-101, Rule 1.6 provides broader pro-
tection, encompassing everything relating to representation regardless of whether it is
embarrassing or detrimental. See Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.6 Model Code
Comparison.
22. See Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.6(b)(1); Model Code, supra note 11,
DR 4-101(C)(3).
23. The future crime exceptions of the professional duty of confidentiality were
modeled after the future crime exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. See Subin,
supra note 14, at 1146.
24. Much debate surrounded whether the Model Rules should make disclosure
mandatory or discretionary in these circumstances. The debate began in 1979 when
the ABA Commission, chaired by Robert J. Kutak, offered an early draft of the
1997] 2751
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to the extent she reasonably believes necessary "to prevent the client
from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. ' 25  DR 4-
101(C)(3) similarly permits attorneys to reveal their client's intention
"to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime."26 Thus, while the Model Code allows disclosure to prevent
any crime, Rule 1.6(b) limits disclosure to prevent those crimes that
threaten imminent death or substantial bodily harm. The Model
Rules therefore provide more protection for client confidences.
B. Are Matthew's Communications Confidential?
Under normal circumstances, Sarah would be required to keep
Matthew's positive HIV status strictly confidential. It qualifies under
the Model Rules as information "relating to representation '27 because
Sarah needs to know that he is positive to best advise him on estate
planning issues. It also constitutes a "secret" under the Model Code
because he specifically requested confidentiality.28
On the other hand, if Sarah believes that disclosure is necessary to
prevent a crime from occurring, she might have discretion to disclose
his seropositivity to his unsuspecting partner. This determination will
be difficult for her to make. First, she must decide whether Matthew's
possible future conduct would be considered criminal in the relevant
jurisdiction.2 9 If Matthew lives in one of fifteen states that has en-
Model Rules, which were ultimately to replace the Model Code. See Ted Schneyer,
Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 14 Law & Soc. Inquiry 677, 702-03 (1989). The early discussion draft recom-
mended tougher disclosure rules, including one that required lawyers to disclose
client information to prevent substantial bodily harm. Id. at 704-05, 712. This propo-
sal instantly sparked heated controversy; in an outrage, the American Trial Lawyers
Association ("ATLA") claimed that the proposed disclosure rules would ruin the
traditional adversary system of justice. Id. at 711-12. In protest, ATLA instantly be-
gan drafting an alternative code. Id. at 710-11. Ultimately, in 1982, the Kutak Com-
mission conceded and recommended in the final draft that attorneys be permitted,
rather than required, to disclose client confidences when necessary to prevent a client
from committing a criminal or fraudulent act likely to result in substantial bodily
harm or injury to the financial interest or property of another. See Rule 1.6 (Revised
.Final Draft, June 30, 1982, reprinted in 1996 Selected Standards on Professional Re-
sponsibility 18, 18 (Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda eds. 1996) [hereinafter
Selected Standards].
25. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.6(b)(1). Fourteen states have adopted a
version of this rule. See Selected Standards, supra note 24, app. A at 132-40 (State-by-
State Analysis of Ethics Rules on Client Confidences).
26. Model Code, supra note 11, DR 4-101(C)(3). Twenty-five states have adopted
a version of this rule. See Selected Standards, supra note 24, app. A at 132-37.
27. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.6(a).
28. Model Code, supra note 11, DR 4-101(A).
29. For a general discussion of the criminalization of HIV transmission and risky
behavior, see Michael L. Closen et al., Discussion, Criminalization of an Epidemic:
HIV-AIDS and Criminal Exposure Laws, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 921 (1994) (discussing
criminalization of HIV transmission under both traditional crime statutes and specific
HIV-transmission statutes); Karen E. Lahey, Note, The New Line of Defense: Crimi-
2752 [Vol. 65
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acted criminal HIV transmission statutes,30 then his possible conduct
likely would be criminal.31 On the other hand, if he lives in one of the
thirty-five other states, the result would be less clear-his conduct
might, or might not, be considered unlawful under traditional criminal
statutes.32
nal HIV Transmission Laws, 1 Syracuse J. Legis. & Pol'y 85 (1995) (discussing crimi-
nal HIV transmission statutes as a new mode of public health policy).
30. For examples of states that have criminalized knowing transmission of HIV
through sexual intercourse, see: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1993); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 384.24 (West Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-60 (1996); Idaho Code § 39-
608 (1993); ]11. Ann. Stat. ch. 720, paras. 5/12-16. (Smith-Hurd 1993); La. Rev. Star.
Ann. § 14:43.5 (West Supp. 1997); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 18-601.1 (1994);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.5210 (West 1992); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 191.677 (Vernon
1996); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 201.205 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-
20-17 (Supp. 1995); Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1192.1 (Supp. 1997); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-29-
145 (Supp. 1996); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-109 (Supp. 1996); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 9A.36.021 (West Supp. 1997).
For examples of statutes criminalizing other modes of transmission, see: Cal. Penal
Code § 12022.85 (West 1992) (enhancing sentence of convicted felon who rapes with
the knowledge that he or she has HIV); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-7-201.7. § 18-7-
205.5 (West Supp. 1996) (criminalizing sexual conduct as a possible mode of transmis-
sion but only for prostitutes and their patrons); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-6 (Bums
Supp. 1996) (criminalizing throwing blood or other bodily fluids on a law enforcement
or corrections officer); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 529.090 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1996) (criminalizing sexual conduct as a possible mode of transmission but only for
prostitutes and their patrons); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.13 (Anderson 1996)
(criminalizing donating blood, blood plasma, or blood product with knowledge or
constructive knowledge of seroposivity); Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-289.2 (Michie 1993)
(criminalizing donating blood, body fluids, organs or tissues with knowledge of
seropositivity).
31. Most statutes take the following form: "A person commits the offense of ex-
posing another to [HIV] if the person knows he or she [is] positive for [HIV and...
engages in sexual penetration with another person without first having informed the
other person of the presence of [HIV]." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-123(b). For similar
examples, see Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.5210(1) ("A person... who knows that
he or she is HIV infected, and who engages in sexual penetration with another person
without having first informed the other person that he or she has [HIV] is guilty of a
felony."); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-29-145(1) ("It is unlawful for a person who knows that
he is infected with [HMIY] to knowingly engage in sexual intercourse .. . ."); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-109 ("A person commits the offense of criminal exposure of an-
other to HIV when, knowing that such person is infected with HIV, such person
knowingly... engages in intimate contact with another .... ").
Most statutes would therefore criminalize Matthew's conduct if he engaged in sex-
ual intercourse with his partner because he knows that he is positive.
32. Most commentators agree that, theoretically, certain risky behavior can be
prosecuted under traditional criminal statutes such as homicide (murder, manslaugh-
ter, and negligent homicide), attempted murder, or assault. See Closen et al., supra
note 29, at 924. They point out, however, that prosecutions for such behavior have
been rare because of difficulties proving intent to kill or to transmit the virus. Id. at
926-27 (noting that risky behavior does not amount to intent to kill or transmit the
virus). Thus, most cases prosecuted under traditional criminal statutes have involved
defendants who expressed an intention to kill or transmit the virus. Id. at 937. Out of
approximately thirty prosecutions for HIV-related conduct, only four or five cases
involved a defendant who did not express such an intention. Id. at 938. See generally
Jennifer Grishkin, Case Note, Knowingly Exposing Another to HIV, 106 Yale LJ.
1617 (1997) (arguing that the court's decision in Maryland v. Smallwood, 680 A.2d
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
After that deliberation, Sarah then must decide whether her state's
ethical code includes a version of Rule 1.6(b)(1) or DR 4-101(C)(1). 33
Although DR 4-101(C)(1) grants the attorney discretion to reveal any
crime, Rule 1.6(b)(1) limits discretion to reveal only those crimes
likely to result in substantial bodily harm.-4 This additional obstacle is
significant here because it is difficult, if not impossible, to know
whether transmission will actually occur.3 5 Furthermore, transmission
alone may not constitute serious bodily harm because some HIV posi-
tive people may never develop symptoms and instead might live com-
pletely healthy lives.36
In sum, the interaction of the above factors would lead to different
conclusions in different states. For instance, in states with a criminal
HIV statute and a version of DR 4-101(C)(1), a lawyer likely would
have discretion to disclose. In states with no criminal HIV statute and
a version of Rule 1.6(b)(1), however, the conclusion would be less
clear. For instance, in addressing a similar situation, the Delaware
Bar Association concluded that the lawyer did not have discretion to
disclose because Delaware does not have a criminal HIV statute, and
the lawyer could not be certain that transmission, and thus substantial
bodily harm, would occur.37 Similar problems arise in those states
that have adopted a version of DR 4-101(C)(1), but have not enacted
a HIV transmission statute. In these states, a lawyer would have dis-
cretion only if she believed that negligent HIV exposure were a crime
under traditional criminal statutes.
512 (Md. 1996), demonstrated the inadequacy of traditional criminal homicide stat-
utes in prosecuting the knowing exposure of another to HIV).
33. For instance, although more than half of the states follow the Model Rules,
only fourteen states adopted Rule 1.6(b)(1). See Selected Standards, supra note 24,
app. A. at 132-37. Ten states require disclosure either for any crime or for one likely
to result in substantial bodily harm. Id. Finally, twenty-five states follow the Model
Code which grants the lawyer the most discretion. Id. See generally Harris Weinstein,
Client Confidences and the Rules of Professional Responsibility: Too Little Consensus
and Too Much Confusion, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 727, 733-37 (1994) (analyzing the failure
of the much-debated Model Rule 1.6 to create uniformity).
34. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
35. HIV Found in One of Five Semen Samples from HIV Infected Men, AIDS
Weekly, Sept. 11, 1995, at 14, 14-15 (citing a study that revealed that the live and
infectious virus was found only 22% of the time).
36. See John W. Mellors et al., Prognosis in HIV-1 Infection Predicted by the
Quantity of Virus in Plasma, 272 Science 1167, 1167 (1996) (noting estimates that 12%
of infected individuals will remain free from AIDS for over twenty years). Recent
studies suggest that combination drug therapies have been successful in frustrating the
onset of AIDS. See Pear, supra note 8, at Al.
37. Delaware Bar Association Professional Ethics Committee, Op. 1988-2, at 4
(1988). In a footnote, the Delaware Bar mentioned that the criminalization of HIV
transmission is rapidly evolving, but failed to speculate on how that might change the
result. Id. By leaving this question unresolved, the Delaware Bar implied that a crimi-
nal HIV transmission statute, or a more developed common law, might have affected
the result.
2754 [Vol. 65
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C. Sarah Should Maintain Confidentiality
Assuming then that Sarah has discretion to disclose-that is, assum-
ing that she lives in a jurisdiction that follows the Model Code and
criminalizes HIV transmission, Sarah should exercise her discretion
yet nonetheless maintain confidentiality.' As a lawyer for people
with HIV, she should conclude that the benefits of confidentiality out-
weigh the benefits of disclosure.39
Sarah first should recognize the heightened need for confidentiality
in representing people with HIV. Most importantly, confidentiality
secures representation for a population in need of legal assistance.
People with HIV might forego legal representation altogether if they
suspected that HIV-related confidences would not be maintained. 0
In addition, lawyers representing people with HIV routinely need ac-
cess to highly sensitive personal facts-such as the client's seropositiv-
ity, the course of the disease, and the medical prognosis-to fashion
customized estate planning strategies.41 Strict confidentiality, there-
fore, is necessary to ensure full disclosure and allow for appropriate
representation.4' Finally, confidentiality fosters trust. The stigma as-
sociated with carrying the virus makes those afflicted wary of trusting
anyone.4 3 Most clients will be emotionally overwhelmed by the possi-
38. For an empirical analysis of how different disclosure rules affect attorney be-
havior, see Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Re-
sponse to Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 Rutgers L. Rev 81 (1994). In her
study of New Jersey lawyers, Levin finds that few lawyers have ever disclosed infor-
mation in order to prevent the client from hanning another. Id. at 128-30. Even law-
yers required to disclose under the ethical rule were reluctant to do so; only about
half actually disclosed. Id. at 129.
39. If lawyers in general are hesitant to breach confidentiality, lawyers for people
with HIV may be even more hesitant due to their clients' heightened need for confi-
dentiality. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
40. Significant harm can result from a breach of confidentiality. The stigma asso-
dated with the disease fosters hostility toward people with HIV, often resulting in
ostracism and discrimination. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
41. For instance, in choosing the executor of a will, a lawyer must know the client's
relationship to his partner vis-a-vis the client's relationship to his family. Often family
members will harbor hostility toward the partner, believing him partially responsible
for the client's life choices. Thus, to formulate an appropriate strategy, lawyers need
to be apprised of such details. See Rivera, supra note 7, at 891-95.
42. See Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.6 cML 2 (observing that confidentiality
encourages the full development of the facts necessary for proper representation);
Model Code, supra note 11, EC 4-1 (same). Some commentators suggest, however,
that the added inducement of confidentiality is unnecessary to encourage client can-
dor. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stanford L
Rev. 589, 614 (1985) [hereinafter Rhode, Perspectives] (positing that clients often have
no choice but to consult a lawyer and offer relevant information); Subin, supra note
14, at 1163-64 (arguing that the complexities of the legal system sufficiently induce full
disclosure because nondisclosure would jeopardize the client's goals). The potential
harm from disclosure in the hypothetical scenario described here, however, suggests
that confidentiality is vital to ensure full disclosure.
43. See Bradford, supra note 7, at 26 (noting that the stigma associated with the
disease has made the AIDS community distrustful of service providers).
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bility of developing a terminal illness. Accordingly, a client needs to
trust his lawyer to handle his legal affairs in the most discreet manner
possible.
In addition to the benefits of confidentiality, Sarah should also con-
sider the risks of disclosure. Disclosure would not only subject Mat-
thew to social stigma, it would also be highly inappropriate and
possibly futile. First, because she represents a group often discrimi-
nated against on the basis of sexual orientation, Sarah should be hesi-
tant about making decisions that might affect her clients' personal
relationships. Disclosure here would be an unwelcome intrusion on
Matthew's sex life. Further, Sarah should question whether disclosure
will prevent any harm. For all she knows, Ben might have already
contracted the disease; he might even already know that he is HIV
positive. Disclosure then would destroy the attorney-client relation-
ship for no reason.
Sarah instead should promise confidentiality to secure an opportu-
nity to counsel Matthew.' She should concentrate on using effective
counseling to persuade Matthew to disclose his seropositivity to
Ben." This approach seems to be the only way she can resolve her
ethical dilemma while respecting her client's moral autonomy.4 6
The ensuing conversation will be challenging for Sarah because it
will directly implicate issues of sexuality, disease, and death. She must
therefore identify the most appropriate counseling strategy-that is,
the strategy best suited to address this ethical problem set in a highly
sensitive context. The next part offers Sarah two lawyering models
that involve different forms of counseling. To determine their effec-
tiveness, Sarah must anticipate the consequences of applying these
models.
44. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.6 cmt. 3 ("Almost without exception, cli-
ents come to lawyers in order to determine what their rights are and what is ...
deemed to be legal and correct.... Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost
all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.").
45. Levin, supra note 38, at 119 (noting that the surveyed lawyers believed that
they had successfully counseled and dissuaded clients from committing wrongdoing).
46. Sarah could also withdraw from representation. See Model Rules, supra note
12, Rule 1.16(b) ("[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal
can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client
.... "); Model Code, supra note 11, DR 2-110(C) (permitting a lawyer to withdraw if
the client's conduct "renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out his
employment effectively"). Here, Sarah arguably has discretion to withdraw under the
Model Rules because such withdrawal would have no effect on his estate planning
representation-Matthew could just go to another lawyer within Sarah's organization.
Likewise, under the Model Code, Sarah arguably has discretion to withdraw if she
feels that her moral beliefs make it impossible for her to effectively represent Mat-
thew. Despite this discretion, Sarah likely will decide against withdrawal. Instead,
she will accept representation and promise confidentiality, hoping that she can per-
suade Matthew to disclose for himself.
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II. Two LAWYERING MODELS
This part analyzes two lawyering models Sarah could adopt in rep-
resenting her client. The first, the neutral partisan model, encourages
her to counsel in a purely advisory capacity. The second, the moral
activist model, directs Sarah to engage Matthew in a more interactive
moral deliberation aimed at securing disclosure.
A. The Neutral Partisan
This section presents the "standard conception of the lawyer's
role,"47 that is, the neutral partisan model. The neutral partisan
model is grounded in justifications for the adversary system and the
client-centered approach to lawyering. This section concludes that if
Sarah adopted this model as her guide, she would inform Matthew of
the legal and moral consequences of any possible future conduct as a
means to persuade him to disclose.
1. Neutral Partisan Model
The standard conception of the lawyer's role is based on two princi-
ples, zealous advocacy and moral nonaccountability. Both principles
are considered necessary to foster human autonomy and dignity by
securing access to the adversary system.48 Both principles are evi-
denced in the ethical rules.
The Model Code strongly advances zealous advocacy on behalf of
the client. Lawyers, as "guardians of the law, ' 49 have a duty to assist
members of the public in securing and promoting their individual legal
rights and benefits.50 In fulfilling this duty, a lawyer must exercise his
judgment "solely for the benefit of his client."51
The Model Rules, despite an attempt to depart from the client-cen-
tered values of the Model Code, 2 likewise highlight the importance of
client self-determination.53 Although the Model Rules treat decision-
47. The term "the standard conception of the lawyer's role" was coined by Gerald
Postema. See Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 63, 73 & n.26 (1980).
48. See Model Code, supra note 11, pmbL ("[J]ustice is based... in respect for the
dignity of the individual and his capacity through reason for enlightened self-govern-
ment."); see also Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 13-14 (1990).
The adversary system generally seeks to protect human dignity and individual rights.
Id. at 15-17. It works to protect a core set of basic rights such as personal autonomy,
trial by jury, the right to call and confront witnesses, the right against self-incrimina-
tion, and a general right to due process of law. Id. at 13. The right to effective counsel
potentially is the most fundamental right as it serves as a threshold to the other basic
rights. Id.
49. Model Code, supra note 11, pmbl.
50. Id. EC 7-1.
51. Id. EC 5-1.
52. Freedman, supra note 48, at 10.
53. See Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.2(a) ("A lawyer shall abide by a cli-
ent's decisions concerning the objectives of representation .... ").
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making as a joint undertaking of both client and lawyer, the Rules
conclude that lawyers should take responsibility for technical and tac-
tical issues, while clients should govern issues such as concern for third
persons who might be adversely affected.54
The Model Rules also explicitly provide for moral nonac-
countability, asserting that a lawyer's representation of a client does
not constitute an endorsement of the client's moral views or activi-
ties. 5  This concept is based on the reasoning that a lawyer who is
morally responsible for the views of a client would not be able to rep-
resent his client zealously, thus denying the client access to the only
system that protects his individual rights.56
Defenders of the traditional approach 57 argue that zealous advocacy
and nonaccountability are essential to the proper execution of a law-
yer's role, which is to protect client autonomy.58 If lawyers cannot
make moral choices for clients, the client appropriately maintains his
right to make his own moral choices rather than have them made for
him.59 As the argument is commonly made: "The job of a lawyer...
is not to approve or disapprove of the character of... her client ....
The lawyer's task is, instead, to provide that competence which the
client lacks and the lawyer, as professional, possesses. 6 °
54. Id Rule 1.2 cnt. 1.
55. Id. Rule 1.2(b) cmt. 3 ("[R]epresenting a client does not constitute approval of
the client's views or activities.").
56. Freedman, supra note 48, at 50 ("Once the lawyer has chosen to accept re-
sponsibility to represent a client, however, the zealousness of that representation can-
not be tempered by the lawyer's moral judgments of the client or of the client's
cause.").
57. See generally id. ch. 3 (defending nonaccountability as necessary to client au-
tonomy); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Prob-
lem, and Some Possibilities, 4 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613 (1986) (presenting moraljustifications for the amoral role of lawyering); Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integ-
rity Thesis, 52 Ohio St. Li. 551 (1991) (defending the current law of lawyering by
arguing that, despite criticism to the contrary, it does allow lawyers to foster their own
integrity).
58. Freedman, supra note 48, at 48 ("[HMuman autonomy is a fundamental moral
concept that must determine, in substantial part, the answers that we give to some [of]
the most difficult issues regarding the lawyer's role."); see also Pepper, supra note 57,
at 615-19 (suggesting that the values of autonomy and equality demand that the cli-
ent's conscience be superior to that of the lawyer's).
59. Pepper, supra note 57, at 617; see also Stier, supra note 57, at 565 ("A lawyer,
within limits, must refrain from judging the morality... [of] a client out of regard for
that client's own autonomy as a moral agent and as an affirmation of the lawyer's own
moral independence within the circumstances of the lawyer-client relationship.").
60. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Human
Rights 1, 8 (1975). Wasserstrom was one of the first to critically examine the "role-
differentiated behavior of lawyers," in which a lawyer's role makes it both appropriate
and desirable for a lawyer to put aside moral considerations that would otherwise be
relevant if not decisive. Id. at 3. For defenses of role-differentiated behavior, see
Freedman, supra note 48, at 44-47 (pointing out that role-differentiated behavior has
its own moral force). See generally Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060 (1976) (arguing that it is
morally right for a lawyer to show favoritism for a client because of the special rela-
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2. Sarah as a Neutral Partisan
In fulfilling her role as a neutral partisan, Sarah would render can-
did legal advice so that Matthew could make an informed choice
about whether to disclose his seropositivity.61 First, Sarah would re-
view with Matthew the legal consequences of nondisclosure such as
possible criminal penalties of possible harmful conduct.6 If legal ad-
vice were inadequate, she would then refer to the moral consequences
of nondisclosure, that is, the harm to an innocent party.'
Thus, the neutral partisan model would allow for some moral delib-
eration, but only to the extent that such deliberation would facilitate
client decision-making and foster client autonomy.64 Sarah would be
reserved in identifying moral considerations, exercising caution to
avoid imposing her moral preference on her client.65 In recognizing
the limit to her moral input, she would respect Matthew as a moral
being, who possesses distinct yet equally valid capacity for moral con-
duct.66 To do otherwise would result in Sarah's moral choice trumping
Matthew's. Sarah, as a neutral partisan, would reject this result as
elitist and paternalistic.
3. Critique of the Neutral Partisan Approach
Despite the neutral partisan's consideration of client autonomy, Sa-
rah should question whether the approach is appropriate here.
Although she admits that her role is not morally passive,' she should
tionship between them); Pepper, supra note 57 (offering a moral-based justification
for the lawyer's amoral role based on autonomy, equality, and diversity); Stier, supra
note 57 (arguing that making lawyers morally accountable would be morally wrong as
a violation of client autonomy).
61. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 2.1.
62. 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering
§ 1.6:304 (2d ed. Supp. 1993).
63. See Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 2.1; Model Code, supra note 11, EC 7-8
("[I]t is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a
decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible."); see also Model Rules,
supra note 12, Rule 2.1 cmt. 2 ("Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such,
moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions .... ")
64. Freedman, supra note 48, at 51 (arguing that the lawyer has responsibility to
provide the client with the fullest legal and moral advice so that the client can make
the most informed choice possible).
65. Stier, supra note 57, at 567. In her study, Levin also found that, despite the
encouragement from the ethical rules, lawyers are hesitant to use moral reasons to
dissuade their clients from engaging in harmful or criminal conduct. See Levin, supra
note 38, at 117-18. As one lawyer explained, "discussions of morality can sound pom-
pous (and)/or condescending... thereby breaking down the channel of communica-
tion." Id. at 118 (citations omitted).
66. Stier, supra note 57, at 567.
67. See Freedman, supra note 48, at 57 (asserting that lawyers act morally by coun-
seling clients about their moral responsibilities); Pepper, supra note 57, at 630-32 (ar-
guing that the lawyer's duty to counsel involves a moral element); Stier, supra note 57,
at 596 (same); see also Robert P. Lawry, Damned and Damnable: A Lawyer's Moral
Duties with Life on the Line, Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1641, 1643-44 (1996) (rejecting the
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recognize that it is morally reserved. First, the model only permits her
to refer to moral considerations as a complement to legal conse-
quences.68 Second, the model encourages counseling only as a neces-
sary part of informed decision-making, rather than as a mode of moral
deliberation.69 Thus, this model de-emphasizes moral considerations
in order to respect client autonomy. Sarah should doubt whether a
lawyer should promote self-determination and reject moral delibera-
tion in the face of possible harm to an innocent third party.
Sarah also should be concerned about stunting her own moral de-
velopment. Limiting her moral input to those considerations that only
go to Matthew's decision-making process would show a lack of moral
integrity.70 Continued moral detachment might result in moral atro-
phy, encouraging Sarah to be decreasingly sensitive to issues that nor-
mally require the utmost sensitivity.71 This desensitizing might hinder
her ability to adequately perform her function as a lawyer,72 as well as
thwart her potential for personal growth.73
B. Moral Activist
In contrast to the neutral partisan model's moral restraint, the
moral activist model suggests that Sarah should not deny moral re-
sponsibility by appealing to her role as a lawyer. Instead, Sarah
should more actively prevent harm to others as her common morality
demands. This section concludes that Sarah, acting as a moral activist,
would enter into a moral dialogue aimed at convincing Matthew that
disclosure is the only morally right choice.
1. Moral Activist Model
Moral activism demands accountability from lawyers for their ac-
tions and tends not to accept professional role expectations as justifi-
cations for lawyers' conduct. 74 In doing so, it denies the premise that
notion of role-differentiated behavior and instead accepting that both the lawyer and
the client are morally involved in the decision-making process).
68. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
70. Reed E. Loder, When Silence Screams, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1785, 1796 (1996)
[hereinafter Loder, Silence] (arguing that one's profession should not require moral
indifference).
71. Postema, supra note 47, at 79-80.
72. Id. at 79 ("[C]ut off from sound moral judgment, the lawyer's ability to do his
job well-to determine the applicable law and effectively advise his clients-is likely
to be seriously affected.").
73. Id. at 78-79 (arguing that neutral partisanship results in severe impoverishment
of the lawyer's moral experience-a kind of moral prostitution); Loder, Silence, supra
note 70, at 1796 ("Professions cannot survive on sanctions and rules. They require
ideals and professional commitment to those ideals. Such allegiance springs from per-
sonal integrity.").
74. David Luban offers the most extensive defense of the moral activist approach
in his book Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study. See David Luban, Lawyers and
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resolving a conflict between role morality and common morality re-
quires lawyers to favor role morality without questioning the institu-
tional justification for the role.75 Moral activism instead supports the
notion that a lawyer's role carries no special privileges.76 "Anything
... that is morally wrong for a non-lawyer to do on behalf of another
person is morally wrong for a lawyer to do as well."'
Thus, when common morality conflicts with role morality, a lawyer
cannot simply favor the role without considering the moral price of
choosing the role. Instead, a lawyer must balance the moral reasons
for accepting that role against the moral reasons for breaking that role
according to common morality.78 "In forming [this] all things consid-
ered judgment, the reasons for acting in role will sometimes outweigh
the reasons for breaking the role; but sometimes they will not."'79
Situations where nondisclosure might result in harm to an innocent
third party demand that a lawyer consider this balance. Although
most moral activists respect a client's right to self-determination, they
agree that one's autonomy right may be compromised to prevent
harm to another."0 The reasoning is: No one is granted autonomy
when it comes to doing violence to others.8'
Thus, when clients threaten harm to innocent third parties, moral
activists shift the moral balance in favor of the victim.' In doing so,
Justice: An Ethical Study pt. I (1988). He questions whether the adversary system
offers sufficient justification for role-differentiated behavior. Id. at 56. Although
Luban admits that such behavior might be justified in the criminal paradigm, he posits
that the adversary system fails to justify role-differentiated behavior in the civil para-
digm. Id. at 58-59. In coming to this conclusion, Luban doubts that the adversary
system effectively ferrets out the truth or is the best method of defending legal rights.
Id. at 68-78. He ultimately suggests that the adversary system exists because there is
no better alternative. Id. at 92-93. See generally Rhode, Perspectives, supra note 42
(arguing that an attorney should not be able to avoid moral responsibility by simply
appealing to a role that allows client interests to trump all others); Paul R. Tremblay,
Practiced Moral Activism, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 9 (1995) (illustrating how the moral
activist approach would apply in a poverty law setting).
75. Luban, supra note 74, at 116; see also Rhode, Perspectives, supra note 42, at
643 ("And a retreat into role fails even to confront, let alone resolve, the moral diffi-
culties it raises.").
76. Luban, supra note 74, at 154.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 125.
79. Id.
80. See Rhode, Perspectives, supra note 42, at 613 (identifying the critical issue as
the extent to which autonomy interests are "reconcilable with fundamental interests
in protecting innocent third parties"); see also Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of
Concealment and Revelation 128 (1982) (arguing that the autonomy argument fails
when secrets result in harm to others).
81. See Subin, supra note 14, at 1162 (asserting that although the client may have
power to subvert the process, he has no right to do so); see also Loder, Silence, supra
note 70, at 1793 ("Safeguarding the client's autonomy to do manifest evil is hardly a
good reason to justify professional silence.").
82. See Subin, supra note 14, at 1159-60 (arguing that the moral balance should
shift because the rationalizations for strict confidentiality are unsubstantiated);
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they make all efforts to ensure that the human dignity of the client
does not outweigh that of the potential victim. 3
2. Sarah as a Moral Activist
As a moral activist, Sarah would conclude that her common moral-
ity requires her to intervene rather than stand idly by while her client
exposes another to a lethal virus.' Moreover, she would feel obli-
gated to interfere, especially because she has the exclusive power to
prevent the harm. 5 Thus, she would enter into a moral dialogue
aimed at convincing Matthew that disclosure is the only morally right
choice.86
Sarah would consider this an exercise of moral activism-that is, in
disagreeing with Matthew's ends, she will try to influence him for the
better.87 On first blush, this approach seems identical to the counsel-
ing approach used by the neutral partisan: Sarah is counseling Mat-
thew on the moral consequences of his potential conduct.88 Moral
activism, however, represents more than an attempt to save the client
from the consequences of his conduct; it is also an attempt to trans-
form and redeem him.8 9 Furthermore, in engaging in such a moral
encounter, the lawyer is also transformed.90 Thus, the moral activist
approach refuses to let the lawyer deny responsibility for immorality
exposed within the attorney-client relationship.
Instead, Sarah would consider her lawyer role as embodying more
moral insight than the average person.9' She would argue that her
legal education provided her with superior practical judgment that
should be used in helping clients see the legal, social, and moral conse-
quences of their actions.92 Counseling then provides Sarah a unique
opportunity to discuss with Matthew the rightness and wrongness of
his options. In exploring the morality of those options, Sarah would
Luban, supra note 74, at 203-04 ("The existence of the injured party expands our
concern for human dignity from one person... to two .... ").
83. Luban, supra note 74, at 203-04 (arguing that to favor the perpetrator of the
harm over the victim would be to say that "the victim's injury is less important than
the [client's] honor").
84. See W. James Ellison, Legal Ethics Condones AIDS Transfer: A Disclosure
Dilemma, 12 Whittier L. Rev. 327, 348 (1991).
85. See Loder, Silence, supra note 70, at 1785-86.
86. See generally Reed E. Loder, Out from Uncertainty: A Model of the Lawyer-
Client Relationship, 2 S. Cal. Interdisciplinary LJ. 89, 134 (1993) [hereinafter Loder,
Out from Uncertainty] (arguing for more moral dialogue within the lawyer-client
relationship).
87. See Luban, supra note 74, at 160.
88. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
89. Luban, supra note 74, at 163.
90. Id. at 165.
91. See id. at 169-70 (discussing Brandeis's vision of phronesis, or "practical wis-
dom," that makes lawyers different from others).
92. See id. at 171.
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try to make Matthew a better person by "steer[ing him] in the direc-
tion of the public good."93
3. Critique of the Moral Activist Model
In one respect, Sarah should prefer this model to the neutral parti-
san model because it does not escape moral deliberation by exclu-
sively appealing to one's role. On the other hand, she should be
skeptical about simply selecting a moral good according to her moral
preference, and then imposing it on the client in a paternalistic man-
ner.94 Although law school sharpened her legal reasoning, she may
not believe that law school truly encouraged her moral develop-
ment.95 She therefore should doubt whether her moral choice is at all
superior to Matthew's.
Furthermore, Sarah should question the applicability of moral activ-
ism in public interest law settings. Moral activism is a client-un-
friendly approach because it encourages the lawyer to value her own
moral judgments over those of her client.96 In private law settings,
this poses no problem because the client can always terminate repre-
sentation and go to another lawyer with less moral discernment.9 In
public interest settings, however, there is no economic protection from
moral overreaching because the client may have no other place to go.
Thus, moral activism poses a serious risk of harm to poor and unpopu-
lar clients by undervaluing the importance of client loyalty and client
autonomy.98
93. Id.
94. See Stier, supra note 57, at 567.
95. As discussed above, the standard conception of lawyering may actually thwart
moral development.
96. Tremblay, supra note 74, at 56 (arguing that the moral activist approach is
particularly problematic when the client is powerless).
97. Id. at 55-56 (explaining that financial incentives deter lawyers from question-
ing the morality of clients' goals).
98. Luban himself recognizes this risk and agrees that certain civil matters, partic-
ularly those between powerless individuals and private megaliths, demand the protec-
tions of the adversary system. See Luban, supra note 74, at 65. He accordingly
reformulates the "criminal defense paradigm" to include:
any litigation context in which zealous advocacy on behalf of relatively weak
clients is justified by virtue of the fact that we have political reasons to aim at
prophylactic, or preemptive, overprotection of the individual from powerful
institutions (including the state, but also including private institutions), even
at the expense of justice.
Id.; see also Rhode, Perspectives, supra note 42, at 606 (noting that some civil cases are
characterized by the same disparity of power between parties as criminal
proceedings).
Although Luban accounts for weak clients, he only does so in litigation contexts
where the client is clearly overpowered; in what Deborah Rhode calls the "David and
Goliath paradigm." Id. at 607. This situation, where Sarah acts in a non-litigation
context for her powerless client, would fall outside of Luban's exception despite the
particular importance of client loyalty and autonomy. See Tremblay, supra note 74, at
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III. THE ETHic OF CARE
To summarize, Sarah should reject both of the above models as un-
acceptable. The neutral partisan model, in forcing her to act accord-
ing to her role, requires her to restrain her moral convictions. 9
Instead, she should accept more moral responsibility in preventing
harm to an innocent person.1°° On the other hand, the moral activist
model, in evaluating moral considerations, too easily allows the law-
yer's moral values to trump those of the client. In doing so, it charac-
terizes lawyers as the moral elite. Although the moral activist
approach may reach for the correct moral outcome, Sarah rightfully
should question the validity of the process. Instead, she should look
beyond the two models described above for yet a third model, 01
A. The Ethic of Care Model
Sarah should look to the ethical approach termed the "ethic of
care," 0 2 which seems to lend the most flexibility by focusing less on
58 (suggesting that one would need a much broader exception to encompass such
matters but questioning whether a broad exception could be justified).
99. See Loder, Silence, supra note 70, at 1796.
100. Id. at 1792.
101. Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings LJ. 1039, 1059-60 (1992)
(encouraging lawyers to value difference, to challenge existing structure, change the
understanding of what lawyers do, and recognize the importance of methods that
have historically been overlooked or excluded).
102. This alternative form of moral reasoning was identified by Carol Gilligan in
her ground-breaking book, In a Different Voice. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different
Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1989) [hereinafter Gilligan,
Different Voice]. Gilligan performed three psychological studies to observe the rela-
tionship between judgment and action in situations of moral conflict and choice. Id. at
2. In one study where a boy and a girl are asked to consider a moral dilemma, Gilli-
gan observes that the boy addresses the problem using deductive logic to differentiate
morality from the law. Id. at 26-27. The girl, however, sees "a world comprised of
relationships rather than of people standing alone, a world that coheres through
human connection rather than through systems of rules." Id. at 29. Although both
children see a need for resolution, he sees it "impersonally through systems of logic
and law" while "she personally through communication in relationship." Id. On this
and similar results, Gilligan concludes that women's moral development is not infer-
ior to that of men's; instead, it is fully developed, but simply different. She sees the
contrasting images of hierarchy and network as two distinct, yet complimentary views
of morality. Id. at 33.
In writing this book, Gilligan hoped to expand the understanding of human moral
development by including women, whose absence from the psychological literature
has generally been interpreted as indicating inferior moral development in women. Id.
at 1-2. Despite this feminist purpose, Gilligan has received much criticism from other
feminists who fear that labeling certain attributes as "female" only reinforces limiting
stereotypes about women. See Cahn, supra note 101, at 1051 ("[By labeling styles as
male or female], we risk perpetuating the very subordination of 'the female voice'
that many of us, as feminists, are trying to overcome."); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Por-
tia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 Berkeley
Women's LJ. 39, 41 (1985) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Portia] ("Attributing be-
havior characteristics to a particular gender is problematic, because... we risk per-
petuating the conventional stereotypes that prevent us from seeing the qualities as
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"abstract rights and duties, but rather on the connections between
people."'1 3 The ethic of care involves a form of moral reasoning that
"eschews sweeping principals in favor of sincere effort to respond to
the particular context in which moral choice must be made."'" It also
involves a form of moral responsibility that seeks to minimize harm by
taking steps according to the particular concrete setting." The ethic
of care rejects the neutral partisan approach because the care perspec-
tive considers moral detachment morally problematic;1 6 it likewise
rejects moral activism in that moral activism supports a hierarchy of
moral truths, whereas the ethic of care tries to elicit understanding
qualities without their gendered context."); Deborah L Rhode, Gender and Profes-
sional Roles, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 39, 42 (1994) [hereinafter Rhode, Gender] (warning
that the celebration of gender differences risks both oversimplifying-because there is
no "generic woman"-and overclaiming-because such sweeping sex-based dichoto-
mies do not exist).
Nevertheless, this largely academic debate has resulted in some agreement. Most,
even Gilligan, agree that the ethic of care does not characterize all women, and is
characteristic of some men. Gilligan, Different Voice, supra, at 2 (stating that the dif-
ferent voice is characterized not by gender but by theme); see Cahn, supra note 101, at
1053 (suggesting that many men and most women actually combine aspects of each
moral orientation); Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supra, at 48 (arguing that any mature
person should be able to consider both types of moral analyses); Rhode, Gender,
supra, at 42 (noting that recent research generally finds "few attributes on which the
sexes consistently vary"). Thus, the ethic of care has been recast as a form of moral
reasoning inherent to every mature person, woman or man.
Legal scholars have since introduced the ethic of care as an alternative model of
legal ethics. See Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo.
LJ. 2665 (1993). Ellmann's article offers a provocative account of how the ethic of
care might transform the lawyering process. Similarly, Naomi Cahn, Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, and Deborah Rhode have addressed how an ethic of care might affect lawy-
ering and the legal profession. See generally Cahn, supra note 101 (analyzing different
lawyering methods as a way to transform the legal practice); Menkel-Meadow, Portia,
supra (focusing on how the inclusion of women's voices will expand our understand-
ing of the lawyering process); Rhode, Gender, supra (seeking to advocate a vision of
professionalism that includes women's experiences as based on feminist commitments
rather than biological categories). For a study documenting the ethic of care as it is
used by both women and men lawyers, see Rand Jack & Dana Crowley Jack, Moral
Vision and Professional Decisions: The Changing Values of Women and Men Law-
yers (1989).
103. Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2665; see Gilligan, Different Voice, supra note 102,
at 30, 32 (setting up two different moral approaches-the boy uses a hierarchy of
rights while the girl considers a network of relationships).
104. Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2668; see Gilligan, Different Voice, supra note 102,
at 32, 38 (noting that the boy abstracts the moral problem from the interpersonal
situation whereas the girl contextually sees the resolution as depending on the charac-
ters and circumstance).
105. Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2668; see also Jack & Jack, supra note 102, at 126-
27 (describing caring lawyers as those who infuse concepts of avoidance of harm and
preservation of relationships into the rights-oriented legal system).
106. See Carol Gilligan, Moral Orientation and Moral Development, in Women and
Moral Theory 19, 30-31 (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987) [hereinafter
Gilligan, Moral Orientation] (criticizing justice reasoning for considering detachment
as the hallmark of mature moral thinking); see also Rhode, Gender, supra note 102, at
49 (arguing that the feminist perspective demands that lawyers accept moral responsi-
bility rather than reflexively retreating into roles).
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among people. 10 7 In sum, the ethic of care resists following rules, pre-
fers to make decisions in context, tries to maintain relationships, and
centers on a responsibility to others.'08
Despite its unique nature, the ethic of care, like the above ap-
proaches, identifies certain moral considerations that deserve more
weight than others. 10 9 Client loyalty is one such consideration, 0 and
thus, caring lawyers can acknowledge greater responsibility to those
they represent than to anyone else in the situation."' Accordingly,
caring lawyers can empathize with the client by trying to see the situa-
tion as the client sees it. 12
On the other hand, a lawyer operating under the ethic of care might
be willing to compromise client loyalty in situations where the client
seeks to harm others or to otherwise act uncaringly."13 Knowing that
the stakes are high, the ethic of care asks whether the lawyer should
really do what her client wants when he threatens harm to another." 4
If she pursues the client's objectives, the caring lawyer may further
such uncaring ventures, thereby inflicting harm on people who also
deserve her care." 5 On the other hand, if she does not pursue the
client's objectives, she may betray her client, thereby damaging the
attorney-client relationship." 6
107. Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2668; see Gilligan, Moral Orientation, supra note
106, at 31 (characterizing justice reasoning as the quest for agreement, whose risk is
the tendency to confuse one's perspective with an objective truth).
108. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism,
and Legal Ethics, 2 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 75, 94 (1994) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
Portia Redux].
109. Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2669-70. Ellmann rejects the argument that the
ethic of care, by focusing on connection, posits that no claim is more important than
another. Id. at 2676-77. He instead argues that the ethic of care does involve making
value judgments; it simply "resists treating moral issues as mathematical equations,
stripped of context and resolved by abstraction." Id. at 2676.
110. See Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supra note 102, at 57 (arguing that the ethic of
care allows a lawyer to enter the client's world and understand more fully what the
client desires).
111. Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2682; see also Jack & Jack, supra note 102, at 127-
28 (noting that caring lawyers recognize that their role includes legal and emotional
responsiveness to clients).
112. Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2694. See generally Stephen Ellmann, Empathy
and Approval, 43 Hastings LU. 991, 991-93 (1992) (discussing the meaning and ele-
ments of empathy in the context of the lawyer-client relationship).
113. See Gilligan, Different Voice, supra note 102, at 65 (noting that a common
theme in care reasoning is the wish not to hurt others); Menkel-Meadow, Portia,
supra note 102, at 46 (describing the girl's hopes to "find a resolution that will hurt
least the one who can least bear the hurt").
114. Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2713.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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Finally, the ethic of care allows a caring lawyer to consider her own
needs for self-care.' 17 As Stephen Ellmann suggests:
At this most mature stage of care reasoning, the caring person rec-
ognizes herself as one of the legitimate objects of her care, and
weighs her needs in the balance with those of others. On the basis
of her own needs, then, a caring person-a person who wishes to
avoid hurting others when possible-will sometimes, deliberately,
hurt them. Such hurt is sometimes unavoidable .... I18
Thus, a caring lawyer must sometimes accept the moral costs involved
in meeting one caring responsibility at the expense of another."19
This notion of self-care further highlights the dynamic nature of the
ethic of care. Because the details of particular situations are central to
the identification of the moral responsibility, care reasoning does not
result in one "right" answer." Instead, in any given scenario, caring
lawyers could apply the ethic of care to the moral problem and come
up with radically different conclusions about the implications of that
ethic for their behavior as lawyers.' 2' This variability is consistent
with the ethic of care. As Carol Gilligan eloquently writes in defense
of contextual particularity: "Only when substance is given to the skel-
etal lives of hypothetical people is it possible to consider the social
injustice that their moral problems may reflect and to imagine the in-
dividual suffering their occurrence may signify or their resolution
engender."'"
B. The Ethic of Care-A More Textured Lawyering Approach
Sarah should feel that the ethic of care is a necessary component of
moral deliberation. Left to its own devices, the neutral partisan model
strongly discourages connection or even association with clients.'2
The moral activist model allows some connection to the client, but
only to the extent necessary for the lawyer to decide on the moral and
legal merits of the client's claim. In contrast to these models, the ethic
of care envisions a more engaged interaction. As Naomi Calm
explains:
Feeling approval of the client's goals is different from feeling con-
nected to the client and [his] needs. Indeed, the very process ofjudging a client's worthiness involves the application of universal
117. Id. at 2684; see Gilligan, Different Voice, supra note 102, at 74 (arguing that
self-care is essential to the ethic of care because to not care for oneself would blur the
line between self-sacrifice and mere caring).
118. Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2684 (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 2684-85; see also Jack & Jack, supra note 102, at 110-20 (defining the
experience of moral cost as the sacrifice of one legitimate moral end so that another
might be accomplished).
120. Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2671.
121. Id. at 2672.
122. Gilligan, Different Voice, supra note 102, at 100.
123. Cahn, supra note 101, at 1063.
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principles in a broad context. That is, to judge any individual cli-
ent's claim, the attorney refers to broad, community-based norms
that she determines.., rather than focusing on the more immediate,
and obvious, needs of the individual client ....
The resulting connection is not necessarily to individual people,
but to abstract principles of justice. 24
Sarah should find the ethic of care much more appealing in that it
requires her to truly connect with her cient.1'5 She should use this
connection to improve her attorney-client relationship, making it
more worthwhile for both parties involved. 126 In doing so, Sarah
should employ care reasoning as a complement to traditional rights-
based moral reasoning.'27 This additional perspective would diversify
her lawyering process by including another level of moral conscious-
ness. 128 Her clients might benefit from a more textured approach.'29
Recognizing these benefits, Sarah should act as a caring lawyer in
counseling Matthew to disclose. Although the ethical rules seem to
forbid such care reasoning, she should indulge herself nevertheless be-
cause care reasoning might help her become a better lawyer and a
better person. As Carrie Menkel-Meadow suggests: "Collective grap-
pling with ethical problems as they are happening [is] far more enrich-
ing... than resolving difficult problems through a priori rules that one
can then argue do not apply or can be distinguished."13 0 Care reason-
ing therefore might encourage moral discernment.
C. The Care Assessment
As a caring lawyer then, Sarah is prepared to consider both the sub-
stance and the particularities of this situation to resolve the moral con-
flict in a way that best maintains the relationships involved.1 3 1 As in
the neutral partisan model and the moral activist model, Sarah will
have to counsel Matthew to disclose. Unlike those two models, how-
124. Id. at 1064-65.
125. Id. at 1065.
126. Id. at 1067.
127. But see Minna J. Kotkin, Professionalism, Gender and the Public Interest: The
Advocacy of Protection, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 157, 171 (1995) (arguing that the
"drive" to take care of people is entirely consistent with traditional notions of zealous
representation).
128. See Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, supra note 108, at 84; Jack & Jack, supra
note 102, at 93-94 (differentiating between rights and care but concluding that using
both approaches "creates the possibility that the concerns of both . . .will be
weighed").
129. Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supra note 102, at 85 (arguing that a care-oriented
approach might enable a lawyer to minimize harm by encouraging more textured
analyses, rather than by enumerating the factors to be considered); see also Rhode,
Gender, supra note 102, at 49 (encouraging lawyers to consider a realistic social and
economic landscape instead of resolving the situation by reference to some abstract
principle).
130. Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, supra note 108, at 110.
131. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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ever, Sarah must consider the connection of relationships rather than
a hierarchy of rights or moral goods. 132
Thus, in embarking on care counseling, Sarah will consider her rela-
tionships with Matthew and with Ben, and the relationship between
Matthew and Ben themselves. She also will consider her client's
needs and her own. Finally, she will consider the particulars of this
situation that affect all the relevant parties.
1. Care for Matthew
Sarah will first consider her relationship with Matthew. In doing so,
she must try to empathize with him, try to put herself in his posi-
tion.133 Matthew is gay and HIV positive in a discriminatory world.
He faces a fatal illness that could potentially manifest itself on any
given day. Although he legitimately fears losing his job, his health
insurance, and ultimately his health, his greatest fear is losing his long-
time partner 34
Sarah will place great importance on Matthew's need and expecta-
tion of support. 35 He seeks legal assistance in order to reclaim some
semblance of order over his life. He comes to Sarah's organization
because it can offer both specialized legal and social services to help
him cope. 13 6 Because Matthew is morally troubled by his situation, he
needs someone who will act as a friend and a confident. In this re-
spect, Matthew deserves a sympathetic listener.137
Furthermore, Sarah is ideally situated to render care to Matthew.
Her work experience has trained her to understand the complicated
and sensitive issues of sexuality, illness, and death. She knows that
she can offer specialized assistance to Matthew in the form of her es-
tate planning expertise, thus helping him to organize his personal mat-
ters on a long-term basis. She also knows that her organization can
provide support services for him, including services that counsel cli-
ents on how to best disclose seropositivity to loved ones.
2. Care for Ben
On the other hand, Sarah will question her loyalty to Matthew be-
cause he threatens to perpetrate uncaring acts on an innocent third
132. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
133. See Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2681-82 (arguing that client loyalty is consis-
tent with the ethic of care).
134. Sarah must expect the worst in this situation. If Matthew discloses to Ben,
Ben might leave Matthew if not for Matthew's positive status alone, then for Mat-
thew's lack of candor. Losing such stability in the face of a fatal disease might threat-
ens Matthew's well-being, on an emotional and possibly even a physical level
135. See Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2685 (positing that caring lawyers should con-
sider the extent of the client's need in choosing clients).
136. See supra note 9.
137. See Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2699-700 (encouraging empathetic under-
standing as a means to win client cooperation).
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party.13  In doing so, Sarah must consider the serious nature of his
threatened behavior. Here Matthew does more than threaten "one"
with an "uncaring" act; instead, in thinking only about his own needs,
he selfishly threatens harm to his closest companion. Furthermore, he
threatens to inflict harm through the most intimate of human interac-
tions-sex itself. This act of selfishness violates autonomy in very
much the same way that rape does. Few acts are more selfish and
uncaring than this.139
Moreover, Sarah has a responsibility to save Ben from contracting
the virus. Although she herself does not have a personal relationship
with Ben, she will recognize the singular importance of saving one
person from the virus. First, her common morality demands that she
care for Ben as much as she cares for Matthew. The sooner he knows,
the sooner he can protect himself. Even if Ben already has the virus,
he would still benefit from disclosure because he would be alerted and
thus could seek medical treatment immediately.140 Second, her pro-
fessional commitments also encourage such care. Sarah decided to
work for an organization that helps people fight against the AIDS epi-
demic. To disregard a risk of transmission would manifest an indiffer-
ence to the cause she cares most deeply about.
3. Care for Herself
Sarah will also consider her own needs. Here, Sarah must recognize
that one of her professional goals is to represent people with HIV in a
compassionate manner. She knows that developing connections with
people is essential in achieving this goal for two reasons. First, con-
nection displays respect for her clients which encourages them to as-
sert control over their lives at a time when many feel powerless and
overwhelmed. Second, connection earns her clients' trust, thus al-
lowing Sarah to help and care for them. Without such trust, Sarah
would be rendered useless and completely ineffective as a lawyer for
people with HIV.
D. The Special Importance of Moral Dialogue
To reconcile these competing interests, Sarah will initiate moral de-
liberation to convince Matthew to disclose. The ethic of care vision,
138. See id. at 2712 (noting the potential conflict between caring for one's client
and caring for others).
139. This evaluation is, of course, for Sarah to make. When considering whether to
further a client's goals, she must consider the extent to which they compromise her
own needs. See id. at 2713.
140. Studies suggest that certain treatments strategies may postpone the onset of
AIDS if administered as early as possible. See Huber, supra note 1, at 9; Kenneth H.
Mayer, The Clinical Spectrum of HIV Infections: Implications for Public Policy, in
AIDS Epidemic, supra note 2, 37, 37 (suggesting that individuals treated with
Azidothymidine (AZT) at early stages might remain asymptomatic for a longer pe-
riod than without such treatment).
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though, is neither reserved like the neutral partisan approach, nor pa-
ternalistic like the moral activist approach. Rather, the ethic of care
suggests an engaging moral dialogue that demands equal participation
from the lawyer and the client.' In this open setting, she will better
understand the needs of the client as the client sees them.' 42 Seeing
the client's situation in a similar light, Sarah might not be tempted to
trump the client's assessment of his own needs because she will under-
stand how he came to make that assessment. 4 3
On the other hand, Sarah's empathy does not require her to simply
defer to Matthew's wishes for nondisclosure. She will instead concen-
trate her efforts on using the trusting relationship between them to
"legitimately influence by guidance and suggestion from within the
circle of intimacy, rather than by directive from without."'" She must
engage herself, both to empathize with Matthew and also to act as an
outside observer. 45 Therefore, she will initiate the dialogue, framing
the discussion in terms of his psychological, physical, and emotional
needs,'" yet reminding him of the health consequences and the moral
implications of his actions.
Although Sarah will exert her professional influence to persuade
him to disclose, she must be careful not to manipulate him.147 Like
the moral activist model, a caring dialogue poses a risk of paternalistic
intervention. This can occur in three ways. First, a lawyer could as-
similate the client's goals into her own, using the client to fulfill her
own agenda.' s Second, the lawyer might over-empathize and lose her
sense of self, thus reverting to the role of a hired gun. 49 Third, con-
nection may become an illusion, a convenient term to mask the typical
inequality between lawyer and client.'50
141. See Gilligan, Different Voice, supra note 102, at 30 (observing that the ethic of
care uses communication as the primary mode of conflict resolution); see also Loder,
Out from Uncertainty, supra note 86, at 138 (arguing for a moral dialogue that most
resembles one of care).
142. Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supra note 102, at 57. But see Ellmann, supra note
192, at 2704 (arguing that a caring lawyer can not so easily refrain from paternalistic
intervention).
143. Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supra, note 102, at 57 (arguing that lawyer domina-
tion is of little concern because the lawyer enters the world of the client and sub-
merges herself).
144. Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2707.
145. Cahn, supra note 101, at 1066.
146. Id. at 1065; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv.
L. Rev. 829, 864-65 (1990) (characterizing the ethic of care dialogue as "consciousness
raising" in that it values honesty over consistency, teamwork over self-sufficiency, and
personal narrative over abstract analysis).
147. Calm, supra note 101, at 1065.
148. Id. at 1066-67.
149. Id.
150. Id.; see also Ellmann, supra note 102, at 2703-08 (rejecting Menkel-Meadow's
suggestion that caring lawyers will refrain from paternalistic intervention).
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These risks, however, are not fatal to caring counseling. Sarah
needs to be acutely aware of the inherent unequal power dynamic. 15 1
This self-awareness and questioning will help her maintain perspective
both inside and outside of the relationship, thus minimizing the oppor-
tunity for exploitation. 152
E. Sarah as a Caring Counselor
Counseling Matthew to disclose will be extremely difficult for Sa-
rah. Because she seeks to directly influence his most personal rela-
tionship, she must proceed with caution. On the one hand, she must
initiate a meaningful conversation that involves emotional, psycholog-
ical, and moral dimensions. On the other hand, she must respect her
client's privacy and autonomy in conducting his sex life. This concern
is particularly relevant in this situation. Because Matthew belongs to
a group whose sexual practices have been historically considered im-
moral, 153 Sarah might choose to temper her moral insights.
With this paternalistic risk identified, Sarah will initiate the dia-
logue. First, she might express her empathy with Matthew. In under-
standing his fear of loss and the emotional difficulty of disclosure, she
might reassure him that these are common feelings among others with
HIV. They then might speak at length about Matthew's relationship
with Ben. For Matthew, Sarah should try to highlight the supportive
aspects of their relationship, reminding him of their long-term com-
mitment. For herself, Sarah should try to assess whether their rela-
tionship will be able to sustain this blow. Because Sarah is trying to
persuade him to disclose, she must reflect, for Matthew's sake, on
what the consequences of his disclosure might be.
Sarah then might speculate on the consequences of nondisclosure.
As a preface, she might couch her moral concerns in terms of public
health advice. She could remind him that he is aware of the risks of
transmission and that safe sex is the only way to save people from the
virus.' 54 Then, she could explore his feelings about exposing Ben to
the virus; perhaps even asking whether Ben is at risk of contracting
the virus. In response to his probably evasive answer, she might ask if
he has thought about disclosure. This approach therefore broaches
the topic of disclosure while maintaining Matthew's power over deci-
sion-making. In this way, Matthew is less likely to feel threatened and
will more likely continue the conversation.
151. Cahn, supra note 101, at 1067.
152. Id.
153. See Huber, supra note 1, at 22-23 (noting how several religious leaders charac-
terized AIDS as God's disapproval of the sinful gay lifestyle).
154. Here, she must be careful not to bore him with a lengthy public health lesson.
He likely does know the risks; she must simply remind him as a seque to the crux of
the discussion.
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Hopefully Matthew eventually will decide to disclose. If at the end
of the dialogue he has not indicated such, Sarah must offer a more
affirmative suggestion. She should point out that disclosure is his best
option. In doing so, she could suggest that disclosure might not de-
stroy his relationship with Ben; instead, she could share her hopes that
Matthew and Ben could fight the disease together, thereby strength-
ening the relationship in their battle. She finally should offer her sup-
port and explain how her organization can refer him to a social
worker who specializes in such issues.
If Sarah successfully engages Matthew, the conversation can move
in a number of directions. Although the content of the conversation is
important, the sharing itself-the connection-is the crucial factor.
Here, if Sarah creates the proper tone, Matthew will not be
threatened by the conversation; eventually, he might even trust Sarah
and value her opinion. Sarah then must focus her energies on devel-
oping a mutually respectful exchange. In sum, the more they share
their experiences and explore the range of emotions, the more likely it
is that they will come to the best resolution-that is, the more likely it
is that Matthew will disclose his seropositivity to Ben.
CONCLUSION
Care counseling does not guarantee that Matthew will disclose; in-
deed, using the neutral partisan or the moral activist approach, Sarah
successfully might have counseled Matthew to disclose. Nevertheless,
Sarah should adopt care counseling for two distinct yet related rea-
sons. First, the ethic of care demands more than an outcome; it de-
mands a process that encourages connection with others and the
exploration of moral and emotional complexities of-what the other
approaches deem-a clear case. The result is, at the very least, a more
constructive attorney-client relationship. Second, the ethic of care
challenges the existing models of lawyering. By integrating connec-
tion as an alternative form of moral reasoning, the ethic of care en-
courages Sarah to question her role as a lawyer and her relationships
with her clients. In doing so, Sarah can learn to better identify and
prioritize her moral, personal, and professional values. Such self-re-
flection will enable her to become a better lawyer and a better person.
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